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Jean-Paul Faguet2 
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Abstract 
I examine decentralization through the lens of the local dynamics it unleashed in 
Bangladesh. I argue that the national effects of decentralization are largely the sum 
of its local-level effects. Hence to understand decentralization we must first 
understand how local government works. This implies analysing not only 
decentralization, but also democracy, from the bottom up. I present a model of local 
government responsiveness as the product of political openness and substantive 
competition. The quality of politics, in turn, emerges endogenously as a joint 
product of the lobbying and political engagement of local firms/interests, and the 
organizational density and ability of civil society. I then test these ideas using 
qualitative data from Bangladesh. The evidence shows that civic organizations 
worked with NGOs and local governments to effect transformative change from the 
grass-roots upwards – not just to public budgets and outputs, but to the underlying 
behaviours and ideas that underpin social development. In the aggregate, these 
effects were powerful. The result, key development indicators show, is Bangladesh 
leap-frogging past much wealthier India between 1990 and 2015. 
 
 
 
Keywords: democracy, decentralization, local government, good governance, civil 
society, Bangladesh  
                                                        
1
 I thankfully acknowledge the LSE’s William Robson Memorial Prize. I thank Taifur Rahman, who 
conducted much of the background research for this paper, and Zulfiqar Ali, Cathy Boone, Qaiser Khan 
and Yaniv Stopnitzky for their insights and constructive criticisms. I am grateful to Pradeep Chhibber, Ruth 
Collier, Tim Dyson, Kent Eaton, Steve Fish, Armando Godínez, David Lewis, Dilip Mookherjee, Ken 
Shadlen, Atiyab Sultan, seminar participants at UC Berkeley, the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, the 2014 
CRASSH conference at Cambridge, and my LSE Development Management students for their thoughtful 
suggestions. All remaining errors are my own. 
2
 Department of International Development & STICERD, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE. j.p.faguet@lse.ac.uk 
2 
 
Introduction 
Does economic and social development depend upon the bold visions of leaders, the 
wisdom of technocrats, or the patience, work and commitment of common people? 
The intellectual history of development studies is more closely allied to top-down 
planning and heroic reform that to the study, or agency, of ordinary citizens. Hence 
the huge impact of Chambers’ (1994, 1997) participatory development model from 
the 1970s onwards, which challenged not just the policy prescriptions, but the 
methods, ideas, and underlying approach of so much development thinking.  
  In a broadly similar vein, decentralization captured the policy agenda in the 
late 1970s, and has never really let go since (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006, Faguet 
2004a, Manor 1997, Rondinelli 1981, Rondinelli et al. 1983, Ter-Minassian 1997). In 
1999 the World Bank estimated that more than 80% of the world’s countries had 
recently, or were currently, experimenting with some form of decentralization 
(Manor 1999). Since then, new or deepening decentralization reforms have been 
announced in several dozen developing and developed countries (Faguet 2012). As 
a useful approximation, we can say that decentralization is happening essentially 
everywhere. 
 What explains such broad and sustained enthusiasm? Unusually amongst 
development fashions, decentralization unites the urge for bold, top-down reform of 
so much development thinking with a focus on grass-roots development and the 
rights and agency of ordinary individuals. It allows both politicians and researchers 
to have their cake and eat it. Also, the claims made on its behalf are powerful.  
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 Decentralization has been promoted across the world as a way to improve 
the efficiency and responsiveness of government, and hence the quality of public 
services (Channa and Faguet 2012). Multilateral and bilateral development 
agencies, alongside NGOs of various types, adopted decentralization as a potential 
solution to a diversity of ills, from improving schools and health clinics to deepening 
democracy and raising the rate of growth. Meanwhile, detractors argue that local 
governments naturally suffer from less probity than national government, which 
additionally benefits from the best human resources available to the public sector. 
Hence, decentralization will tend strongly to increase corruption and decrease the 
quality of policymaking in countries that adopt it (Manor 1999, Prud’homme 1995, 
Rondinelli 1981).  
  Which camp is right? As Faguet (2012 and 2014) demonstrates, both are. 
Decentralization is not a simple, linear reform that should be expected to have 
homogeneous effects across any country in which it is implemented. It is, rather, a 
complex reform that alters the rules, structures and norms by which a society is 
governed. Its effects will vary as according to the underlying characteristics of the 
subnational units (e.g. provinces, localities) affected. Hence we should expect 
decentralization to have heterogeneous effects across any country, and for this 
heterogeneity to increase as countries’ underlying diversity increases. The more 
interesting questions are: In any country that decentralizes, why do some local 
governments perform better in terms of accountable, responsive governance, and 
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others worse? And as a result, why do some municipalities achieve better human 
development outcomes than others? 
I explore these questions with detailed evidence from Bangladesh. I begin 
reviewing national-level evidence of decentralization’s effect on primary services,  
before delving deep down into the local political economy and social dynamics that 
underpin the behaviours which, in the aggregate, comprise such national results. 
Micro-level evidence comes from 2 upazillas, which I analyse through the lens of 
Faguet’s (2012) model of local government responsiveness and accountability, in 
order to shed light on the causal relationships that lead to better and worse local 
development outcomes. The ultimate goal is to better understand both how 
decentralization works, and how governance reform can help accelerate 
development in South Asia. The experience of working in this way will additionally 
provide deep insight into how questions of deep institutional reform should be 
studied. 
 The empirical literature to which this paper seeks to add is enormous, 
including literally hundreds of published journal articles; add the “grey literature” of 
policy studies and agency reports, and the number ascends into the thousands. Only 
a brief overview of some of the most relevant works can be provided here. Galiani, 
Gertler and Schargrodsky (2008) find that decentralization of school control from 
central to provincial governments had a positive impact on student test scores in 
Argentina, although the poorest did not gain, and may have lost ground. Barankay 
and Lockwood (2007) find that greater decentralization of education to Swiss 
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cantons led to higher educational attainment, allowing boys to close the gender gap 
with girls. Eskeland and Filmer (2002), Faguet and Sánchez (2013), and Parry 
(1997) also find that decentralization led to improvements in educational outcomes 
in Argentina, Colombia, and Chile respectively. Johnson, Deshingkar and Start 
(2005) present evidence that India’s recent decentralization empowered the rural 
poor in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh through such instruments as rice 
subsidies and credit for women. But their enthusiasm is limited: the pro-poor 
outcomes achieved, they argue, were due to central and state governments’ ability 
to counterbalance the elite capture that decentralization tends to spawn. 
Parker (1995) disputes the notion that decentralization naturally abets elite 
capture, arguing that reform is associated with better substantive outcomes as well 
as improved government processes. In various case studies he finds evidence that 
decentralization increased beneficiary participation in decision-making in rural 
development schemes throughout Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, leading to superior 
outcomes. Parker also relates the suggestive story of decentralization in Bangladesh, 
where extremes of wealth and power allowed local elites to capture nascent local 
governments (p.25). Subsequent elections overcame this distortion, and over 90 
percent of local councilmen were ejected from office. Along similar lines, Rowland 
(2001) and Blair (2000) show how decentralization improved the quality of 
democratic governance in both large cities and small towns in India, Bolivia, Mali, 
Mexico, Honduras, the Philippines and Ukraine. Shankar and Shah (2003) find that 
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the political competition spurred by decentralization decreased levels of regional 
inequality in a sample of 26 countries.  
Huther and Shah (1998) find positive correlations between decentralization 
and indices of social development, political participation, and an overall quality of 
government index in a sample of 80 countries, for which they infer causal 
relationships. Campbell (2001) goes further, highlighting the huge scope of 
authority and resources that have been decentralized throughout Latin America. 
This is, he argues, a “quiet revolution” that is generating a new model of governance 
based on high popular participation, innovative, capable leadership, and a new 
implicit contract governing local taxation. Such results are possible, according to 
Petro (2001), because decentralization affects not only formal, official institutions of 
government, but also spurs changes in the very fabric of society – its values, 
priorities and social capital. 
As for most questions that can be asked of decentralization, the evidence 
against is also compelling (Faguet 2014). Much evidence points to decentralization’s 
harmful effects on public services. Using subjective characterizations of the degree 
of ‘publicness’ of different health activities, Akin, Hutchinson and Strumpf (2005) 
find evidence that Ugandan local governments are allocating declining proportions 
of their budgets to public goods, and increasing shares to publicly financed private 
goods. Bardhan & Mookherjee (1998) test for elite capture in 89 villages in West 
Bengal. Although they find little evidence of capture in the allocation of private 
goods, public goods projects do exhibit capture. They theorize that this is because 
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public goods are inherently less transparent – it is less clear than for private goods 
who gets how much. 
There is bad news on poverty and the environment as well. Decentralization 
will fail to improve access of the poor to natural resources, predicts Woodhouse 
(2003), and will fail to reduce ecological damage. Casson and Obidzinski (2002) go 
further: decentralization in Indonesia spurred depredatory logging by creating 
bureaucratic actors with a stake in its environmental degradation. Why do 
decentralized governments perform so poorly in terms of policy outputs? According 
to Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003)and Ellis and Mdoe (2003), the policy processes that it 
creates are to blame. Both find that decentralization propagated rent-seeking 
behaviour down to the district and lower levels in Tanzania and Uganda. Francis 
and James (2003) and Bahiigwa, Rigby and Woodhouse (2005) similarly show that 
decentralization in Uganda has not led to independent, accountable local 
governments, but rather to elite capture. Decentralization has thus failed as a tool 
for poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (Porter 2002). 
Montero and Samuels (2004) explain the empirical link between elite 
capture and decentralization, arguing that the political motives of reformers often 
combine with ex-post vertical imbalances to worsen both elite capture and regional 
inequality. Smith (1985), Solnick (1996), and Crook and Sverrisson (1999) go 
further, arguing that local government’s lack of human, financial and technical 
resources will prevent it from providing effective public services under 
decentralization, regardless of whether policies are “tailored” to local conditions or 
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not. Using similar language, Smith (1985) and Crook and Sverrisson (1999) argue 
that power should remain in the hands of relatively resource rich central 
governments, as local government’s lack of financial, technical and human resources 
will cripple its production of local public goods. 
A large set of results showing that decentralization can improve the quality 
of governance and policymaking are thus more-or-less counterbalanced by a 
smaller but still compelling set of results showing the opposite, leaving it hard to 
conclude whether reform improves or degrades governance. But perhaps this 
selection of studies is skewed? We can check for this by consulting the broadest 
surveys of the literature. These take a more positive view of decentralisation, but 
are ultimately inconclusive. Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis (1983) note that 
decentralisation has usually disappointed its supporters. Most developing countries 
implementing decentralisation experienced serious administrative problems. The 
few comprehensive evaluations of costs and benefits conducted indicate limited 
success in some countries but not others. A decade and a half later, surveys by 
Manor (1999), Piriou-Sall (1998), and Smoke (2001) are slightly more positive, but 
with caveats about the strength of evidence in decentralisation’s favour. Manor 
notes that the evidence, though extensive, is still incomplete, but ends his study with 
the opinion that ‘while decentralisation …is no panacea, it has many virtues and is 
worth pursuing’. Smoke, by contrast, finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal, and 
asks whether there is empirical justification for pursuing decentralisation at all. 
9 
 
Given the sheer size of the literature, our inability to answer even simple questions 
is striking. 
Understanding decentralization 
Before delving into new empirical evidence, it is useful to consider why the 
literature finds itself at such an impasse. As I have noted in more detail elsewhere 
(Faguet 2012), this is largely due to a highly centralized (ironically) intellectual 
approach to the study of decentralization. Explicitly or implicitly, the majority of 
empirical studies of decentralization treat it as a top-down reform with simple, 
linear effects on the variables analysed. Decentralization is like “flipping a switch”, 
the effects of which flow symmetrically through a political and administrative 
system. Such a view is not only incorrect but downright odd. As Beer (2003), Boone 
(2003), Faguet (2012), Grindle (2007), and Putnam (1993) have noted, our first-
order expectations for the effects of democratic decentralization should be 
heterogeneity. The point of decentralization is to devolve power, authority and 
resources to subnational officials with independent electoral mandates whom the 
centre cannot control. In such a situation, it is possible that elected officials in 
hundreds or thousands of local authorities would behave similarly. But it is highly, 
highly unlikely. It is far more reasonable to expect local governments’ reactions to 
decentralization to vary as much as their underlying social, economic and political 
characteristics do. 
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Put another way, the question, “Does decentralization improve service 
delivery?” has two obvious answers: 
(1) Yes. Of course services will improve. In at least some localities, resources will 
be spent and decisions taken in such a way that education, health, and other 
services improve compared to what central government provided. 
(2) No. Of course services will worsen. In at least some other localities, resources 
will be spent and decisions taken in such a way that education, health, and 
other services worsen compared to what central government did before. 
In a third set of localities, which in many countries may be the majority, services will 
continue much as before, neither significantly better nor worse, and 
decentralization will have little effect. This is true not by assumption, but by the 
very definition of decentralization, which even in relatively homogeneous countries 
should lead to a greater diversity of outcomes, in both type and efficiency. The 
“outputs” of decentralization are thus the simple aggregation of all of the local 
outputs that reform produces. Each of these local outcomes is, in turn, driven by 
interactions of the underlying actors and characteristics of each place. The 
necessary implication is that for much of the past four decades, researchers have 
been asking the wrong sorts of questions, of a type: ‘Is decentralization good or bad 
for policy variable X?’ A far better approach is to admit from the outset that 
decentralization leads to a broad heterogeneity of response, and ask: ‘Why are the 
good outcomes good, and why are the bad outcomes bad?’ To understand the effects 
of decentralization on any political and administrative system, we must begin our 
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analysis at the grass roots. To understand decentralization, we must first 
understand how local government works. 
A theory of (local) government responsiveness 
Why do some local governments work well and others badly? Consider 
Faguet’s (2012) model of local governance depicted in figure 1 below. Our goal is to 
understand the determinants of responsiveness and accountability in local 
governance. As the figure implies, the first-order determinant of a responsive, 
accountable government is an open, substantively competitive politics. Where 
politics is open to new entrants and focuses on issues of substance, as opposed to 
appearance, political competition will produce a strong inclusive tendency in the 
sense of not leaving significant groups of voters unrepresented. Political platforms 
will tend to focus on the real needs of voters and firms, rather than descending into 
beauty contests. Hence, the best predictor of governments that are accountable and 
responsive is open political systems where competition is substantive and political 
entrepreneurialism3 possible. 
                                                        
3
 Political entrepreneurialism can be defined as the identification, by a new politician or party, of a bloc of 
voters ill-served by existing political competition. When she then develops proposals and messages attuned 
to this bloc’s needs, and wins their votes in the following election, she is acting as a political entrepreneur 
(Faguet 2012). 
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Figure 1: A theory of (local) government responsiveness 
 
Reproduced from Faguet (2012), with permission from the University of Michigan Press. 
But open, competitive politics is not a fixed municipal characteristic. Rather, 
it emerges endogenously through the interaction of local economic interests and 
civic organizations. Where the firms and other economic interests that comprise the 
local economy are diverse and heterogeneous, and where civil society is organized 
into many, active groups, and where these two sets of actors interact with one 
another through local politics, proposing needs, debating competing priorities, and 
searching for avenues of mutual benefit, local politics will tend strongly towards 
openness and competition as described above. 
Where, by contrast, the local economy is dominated by a single large actor, 
the diversity of political forms that supports broad representation will tend not to 
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emerge. And where civil society is atomized into individuals, and the intermediating 
organizations that aggregate preferences and organize collective action are missing, 
politics will tend to become divorced from society’s needs (Faguet 2004b). In either 
case, politics will tend to be less open and less competitive, or competitive in 
dimensions orthogonal to the needs of voters and the economy. As the figure also 
implies, economic interests and civic organizations are capable of exerting direct 
effects on responsiveness and accountability too. But evidence suggests that these 
effects are weak, and hence firms’ and civic organizations’ primary channel of 
influence is through the political system. 
I apply this model to evidence from two local governments in Bangladesh 
with very different levels of performance. But first it is both useful and interesting to 
review national-level evidence on the effects of decentralization there, in the context 
of Bangladesh’s recent development success. 
Decentralization in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh’s decentralization program began in 1997 with the Local 
Government Act, followed by the Upazila and Zilla Parishad Acts of 1998 and 2000. 
These reforms decentralized power and resources from central government to 
division, district, sub-district, and union levels, bringing forth a new era of 
decentralized government. In so doing, they took government “closer to the people”, 
and opened many new spaces for Bangladesh’s vibrant civil society to participate in 
local decision-making (Faguet and Ali 2009). It is nonetheless important to note that 
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decentralization in Bangladesh falls short of the standard set in other countries, 
such as India, Colombia and Bolivia, in terms of both the quantity of resources, and 
the scope of public authority devolved.4 
The past generation has brought significant progress to Bangladesh, which 
will come as a surprise to those who still view the country through the lens of the 
crises that attended its birth. At independence, observers described the country as a 
site of recurrent natural disasters, and a crowded labour reserve with few prospects 
for development (Faaland and Parkinson, 1976). But in 1990-91 the country 
achieved a significant break in its growth and development trends, and moved onto 
a higher growth path averaging 3.2% per capita between 1990-2005 (Mahajan and 
Hussain 2006). Economic growth was accompanied by impressive rates of poverty 
reduction, and improvements in other social indicators. Between 2000-2005, for 
example, the share of population living in poverty declined from 49% to 40%, and 
that living in extreme poverty fell from 34% to 25% (Mahajan and Hussain 2006). 
Longer-term trends in social development indicators show even faster 
progress. Table 1 details how such indicators have improved, often dramatically, 
between the 1970s-80s vs. the 1990s-2000s. Driven by such improvements, 
Bangladesh met its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on gender parity in 
primary and secondary schooling a decade ahead of time, with current girl/boy 
ratios of 1.03 in primary schools, and 1.14 in secondary schools (Government of 
                                                        
4
 Shami and Faguet (2015) discuss in detail the political imperatives that explain different decentralization 
designs. 
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Bangladesh 2015). Amongst 11-12 year olds, slightly more girls than boys have been 
completing the five-year cycle for over a decade (Chowdhury et al. 2003). The MDG 
target of halving the population living in poverty was met in 2012. Bangladesh also 
met MDGs on reducing the poverty gap ratio, reducing under-five mortality, 
containing HIV infections, children under five sleeping under insecticide-treated bed 
nets, and the detection and cure of tuberculosis. Indeed it is notable that, despite a 
GDP/capita only half that of India, “Bangladesh is doing better in all aspects of 
human development than India” (Amartya Sen, quoted in Kumar 2013). In such key 
social indicators as life expectancy, infant mortality, under-five mortality, total 
fertility, infant immunization, and a number of indicators of women’s well-being, 
Bangladesh has raced ahead of its giant neighbour despite slower economic growth 
(Economist 2012, Mahmud et al. 2013, Sen quoted in Kumar 2013). 
But other MDGs, such as maternal mortality and health, child malnutrition, 
women’s employment generation, adult literacy, and forestry cover were not met 
(Government of Bangladesh 2015). Accelerating progress in these areas is an 
important priority for both donors and the government. One contribution of this 
paper is to analyse the locally-specific institutional underpinnings of rapid social 
development. 
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Table 1:  Improvement in Bangladesh’s Social Development Indicators 
 
Source: World Bank (2007); Library of Congress (2007) 
Impressive as these changes are, closer examination reveals persistent, 
striking variation across space in key social indicators. For example, primary 
completion and enrolment rates are respectively 62% and 54% higher in the 
highest regions of the country than the lowest. Trends diverge even within the same 
city: the ratio of girls to boys in school is 30 points lower in “Standard Metropolitan 
Area” Dhaka than “Other Urban” Dhaka. Infant mortality, measles vaccination 
coverage, and child malnutrition also vary significantly across Bangladesh’s regions. 
And even these large differences – essentially amongst different parts of the public 
service provision system – are trumped by variation between public and non-
governmental service providers. Chaudhury (2006), for example, uses data from 
1994-2004 to show that areas of the country served by a pioneering NGO in health 
care, Gonoshasthaya Kendra (GK), reduced infant mortality consistently to levels of 
32 per thousand live births in 2004, while the country as a whole remained above 
50. 
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How can we explain such large differentials? Following North (1990), 
Williamson (1995), Olson (2000), and other institutional theorists, my analysis is 
based on the notion that differences in social indicators are explained by the wide 
variations in primary service provision (e.g. health care, education) across 
Bangladesh. And variations in service provision are explained by the different 
patterns of accountability and objective incentives that local officials face. And 
incentives and accountability are largely explained by the underlying 
understandings and dispositions that individuals must share if formal and informal 
institutions are to work effectively (Bourdieu 1986). 
Hence to understand decentralized outcomes we must go beyond the 
organizations that produce successes and failures in public service delivery, beyond 
the institutions in which they are enmeshed, and beyond even the informal rules 
and conventions that govern incentives. We must go down to the underlying 
dispositions, understandings and beliefs that drive social behaviour, and so help 
determine whether a particular set of organizations and policies can successfully 
meet citizens’ needs, or not. By focusing our analysis at this level we can better 
understand the incentives faced by both the users and producers of public services, 
and hence the degree of accountability faced by public servants. And, institutional 
theorists tell us, when we understand incentives and accountability, we are a long 
way towards understanding public sector effectiveness. 
This paper investigates the operation of such a pathway in Bangladesh via 
close examination of the institutional and social underpinnings of service provision 
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in two upazilas. Upazilas are the third of four levels of sub-national administration 
in Bangladesh, with an average population of 250,000, and are roughly similar to 
municipalities elsewhere (Library of Congress 2008). The two cases were chosen 
purposively from the extremes of high and low-performers in terms of social 
development outcomes, focusing especially on child and maternal mortality. I focus 
on extremes of performance in the hope of gaining analytical richness and insight 
into the object of this research: the causes of bad and good social development 
outcomes. I dwell mostly on the health sector in the interest of focus and brevity. 
Rajnagar is the low-performing upazila, and Saturia is the high-performer. 
My evidence is based on extensive qualitative and quantitative fieldwork by a 
team from the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. It indicates that two 
factors are responsible: (1) Services are in much higher demand in Saturia, with 
greater knowledge of the benefits of health care, greater acceptance of modern 
clinical methods, and fewer barriers to access due to traditional customs and beliefs; 
and (2) Health care provision is systematically better in Saturia, with services more 
suited to the needs and characteristics of the local population made available to 
more villages more frequently than in Rajnagar. I explain these differences as a 
function of the deeper social and institutional context in which services are 
demanded, and provided, in each upazila. 
19 
 
Local government at the extremes: Saturia and Rajnagar 
Rajnagar upazila is located in Moulvibazar district on Bangladesh’s eastern 
border with India, while Saturia upazila is located in Manikganj district west of 
Dhaka. Figure 2 locates them on a map of Bangladesh. Despite being farther from 
the capital, Rajnagar is wealthier, with more livestock assets per family and an 
average household income of Tk.7,081/month compared to Saturia’s 
Tk.5,831/month. Average landholdings are lower in Saturia, at 137 decimals5 per 
household, vs. 182 in Rajnagar. And Saturia’s literacy rate of 58% is also lower than 
Rajnagar’s 64%. This is at least partly due to Rajnagar’s large diaspora in the UK, 
and the remittances they send home. Indeed, it is possible to fly directly to the UK 
from the nearby airport in Sylhet. But inequality is also higher in Rajnagar, with 
more households in both the extreme rich and poor categories, while 86% of 
Saturia’s population lies in the middle two categories. 
                                                        
5
 One decimal equals 1/100
th
 acre. 
20 
 
Figure 2: Rajnagar and Saturia 
  
source: Map courtesy of Armanaziz and Wikipedia, under a GNU free documentation license. 
Paradoxically, Rajnagar has systematically worse health indicators than 
Saturia. Under-five mortality in 2005 was 40 per thousand in Rajnagar, compared to 
13 per thousand in Saturia; the notional maternal mortality rate over the previous 5 
Saturia Upazila
Rajnagar Upazila
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years was 791 per hundred thousand live births in Rajnagar, compared to 0 in 
Saturia; and the prevalence of illness in Rajnagar was 36%, compared to 25% in 
Saturia. Data on complications during childbirth tell a similar story: mothers in 
Saturia suffered less from long labour, excessive bleeding, high fever and 
convulsions than mothers in Rajnagar. In light of this, it is not surprising that 
Rajnagar has had considerably less success in reducing its maternal and child 
mortality rates  over the past few years than Saturia. 
It is also not surprising that much of this is due to Saturia’s better 
infrastructure and superior provision of health services. Pregnant mothers receive 
less  antenatal care in Rajnagar (73%), for example, than Saturia (91%). Fewer 
mothers are informed about the signs of pregnancy complications in Rajnagar 
(63%), and where to go when they occur (73%), than Saturia (83% and 87%). 
Access to sanitary toilets is lower in Rajnagar (69%) than Saturia (90%). Fewer 
mothers receive nutritional supplements and vaccinations during pregnancy in 
Rajnagar, and fewer have a post-partum check-up, and less quickly, than Saturia. 
Additional data on child health interventions and outcomes in the two sub-districts 
is summarized in table 2. 
Table 2:  Selected Child Health Indicators by Upazila 
 
Indicator (all %) Rajnagar Saturia
Chest problems incidence, previous 2 weeks 24.2 12.9
Breathing difficulty incidence, previous 2 weeks 28.4 18.2
Coughing incidence, previous 2 weeks 59.3 35.1
Diarrhoea incidence, previous 2 weeks 42.5 25.4
Newborns fed colostrum immediately after birth 84.7 90.9
Vitamin A given to child 72.7 82.9
Measles Immunization Rate 85.6 93.0
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If local wealth does not explain these divergent health outcomes, what does? 
The answer cannot relate to the structure of the health sector nor of local 
government, nor to the design nor quantity of the physical infrastructure available, 
as these are common to both upazilas. Both Rajnagar and Saturia benefit from 
similar administrative apparati, with similar levels of resources and staffing. And 
both are served by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which uses a 
standardized, homogeneous model of health provision in Bangladesh that allocates 
resources mechanically, deploys assets uniformly, and is as a result insensitive to 
local characteristics or variations in local demand (Pearson 1999). Both upazilas 
have benefited similarly from health reforms implemented over the past thirty 
years, especially in the fourth and fifth five-year plans, which launched important 
efforts to reduce maternal and infant mortality, and introduced a basic package of 
primary services called the Essential Services Package (ESP) (Pearson 1999; 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2008). While experts agree that these 
reforms have helped improve Bangladesh’s health indicators (Ensor et al. 2002; 
World Health Organization 2008), their impact in Rajnagar and Saturia has not 
differed. Hence the variations described above must be due to something else. 
If the answer is not local health “hardware”, can differences in performance 
be explained by aspects of the health system’s “software”? Visits to the two upazilas 
reveal differences in the maintenance and operation of health facilities that are 
striking and systematic. Saturia’s Upazila Health Complex (UHC) was clean and well-
maintained, with more bathrooms available, all in working order and clean, the 
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operating room used regularly and in good repair, and staff absenteeism of only 1%. 
Contrast this with Rajnagar, where staff absenteeism was ten times greater, toilets 
were so dirty they had become unusable, most of the rooms, wards, windows and 
doors were damaged, and the operating room was abandoned. Health workers 
made far fewer community visits in Rajnagar than Saturia, leaving residents more 
reliant on this degraded infrastructure. In detailed interviews, patients in Saturia 
reported being quite happy about the quality of services they received, while in 
Rajnagar opinions were far more negative. 
Such differences grow sharper at lower (“more local”) levels. The Union 
Health and Family Welfare Centre (UHFWC) visited in Rajnagar had no doctor in 
charge and was badly understaffed. When staff attended at Satellite Clinics (SCs) in 
the villages, it was forced to close, leaving it open only three days a week. By 
contrast, the UHFWC in Saturia was fully staffed and open 5 days a week. Facilities 
were badly maintained and dirty in Rajnagar, with the toilets once again unusable, 
but well-maintained and clean in Saturia. In Saturia, medicines were well-stocked 
and regularly replenished, whereas Rajnagar received no medicines from the 
Ministry. Saturia’s water infrastructure was in good repair, but in Rajnagar the 
tubewell did not function, and water supply lines were damaged. Both have 
electricity, but while in Saturia the operating room was in good order and regular 
use, very few fans or lights worked in Rajnagar, making it unusable. 
Not surprisingly, performance indicators were higher in Saturia than 
Rajnagar. In 2005 the Saturia facility treated 8,000 patients, while the Rajnagar 
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facility, which served a larger overall population, treated only 4,400. At the village 
level too – on the day each was visited, only 24 patients were treated at the Rajnagar 
SC compared to 85 at the Saturia SC. This helped reduce costs in Saturia. Better 
functioning of each element of the health services pyramid not only extended 
services to more patients, but treated many conditions at lower-costs installations, 
such as SCs, effectively reducing unit costs throughout the upazila. 
Objective differences between the two upazilas in health services translate 
directly into subjective measures of the quality of care received. Patients in Rajnagar 
reported far lower satisfaction with a number of important factors, including: 
availability of doctors, availability of drugs, physical infrastructure, utilities, quality 
of food, waiting time, cleanliness and hygiene, the attitudes of their doctors and 
other service providers, attitudes of office staff, privacy of treatment, availability of 
medical supplies and the quality of treatment received. Patients in Rajnagar  
reported much longer waits for treatment than those in Saturia, where 72% thought 
they would be able to follow doctors’ instructions, vs. 56% in Rajnagar. 
In summary, Saturia and Rajnagar were endowed with structurally identical 
public health systems, and a similar quantity and design of assets. But these assets 
were used in very different ways, leading to significant differences in the quantity 
and quality of services provided in each. Such differences led to significant 
differences in real health outcomes, and explain why people in Rajnagar suffered 
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from more diseases, and had less healthy mothers and children, than those in 
Saturia.6 
Theorizing the transformation of governance 
The contours of this contrast are all the more remarkable when we consider 
how recent it is. As Ali and Rahman (2006) point out, until the late 1990s attitudes 
and behaviours towards health were quite similar across the two upazilas, resulting 
in similar outcomes. “It was not like this ten years ago,” observed one interviewee, 
recalling Saturians’ fears and superstitions concerning modern health care, 
especially maternal health. But now attitudes have changed, and performance has 
followed. How do we explain these changes? 
To answer, we must dig deeper into the underlying incentives and 
behaviours at work in local government. Following the examples of Evans (1995, 
1996), Ostrom et al. (1993), and Tendler (1997), we must understand how these 
incentives and behaviours arise out of people’s beliefs and social relations. Consider 
first focus group evidence on the important differences in how public services were 
monitored in the two upazilas. In Saturia, health authorities reported extensive 
monitoring by their superiors at the district level, with frequent visits to the area; in 
Rajnagar, their similars reported no such monitoring. Monitoring establishes 
                                                        
6
 A detailed econometric analysis of health data in the two areas by Ali and Rahman (2006) supports this 
point. 
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upwards accountability in Saturia’s health system, and no upward accountability in 
Rajnagar.7 
The active involvement of union parishad  (UP) officials in health delivery 
issues makes downward accountability binding in Saturia. UP chairmen take steps 
to facilitate proper implementation of health programs in Saturia, and union officials 
regularly monitor service quality in town and villages. Our research team 
corroborated this in many specific ways in Saturia, but found no evidence in 
Rajnagar, where health officials operated in an institutional vacuum, disconnected 
from both their superiors and elected representatives (Ali and Rahman 2006). In 
such a context, it is not surprising that performance was unresponsive. This echoes 
Chaudhury’s (2006) findings on the health NGO Gonoshasthaya Kendra (GK). He 
attributes GK’s remarkable success in improving basic health care indicators to the 
community-level upwards and downwards accountability it is able to generate. 
The attitudes and behaviours of ordinary citizens also differed remarkably in 
Saturia vs. Rajnagar. Saturia’s citizens were extensively involved in the delivery of 
health services, and interactions between health workers and citizens were regular 
and often intense. As a result, health workers maintained quite close relationships 
with the people they were meant to serve, and involved them closely in decision-
making. By contrast, ordinary people were kept at arm’s length by Rajnagar’s 
authorities. Popular involvement in health service planning and delivery was almost 
                                                        
7
 Ali and Rahman’s (2006) sister paper provides thick description case studies containing a wealth of 
evidence to this effect. 
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nil. Citizens were far less informed about local problems, and far less likely to 
contribute to their solution (Ali and Rahman 2006). 
Consistent with its more vigorous institutions and more responsive public 
services, citizens in Saturia hold different ideas and attitudes about these services, 
which supported a higher level of demand and more active engagement. Men 
encourage women to participate in health programs and immunization drives. 
Traditional social norms no longer intervene. “Everyone realizes now that having 
more children is the cause of poverty,” explained one respondent. Women visit the 
hospital alone if required, pregnant mothers are vaccinated, and women use birth 
control. Such behaviours span the social ladder. 
New attitudes and dispositions that are conducive to better health, and the 
information on which they are based, operate not just at the individual level, but are 
reinforced and magnified through social interaction. New ideas circulate, and new 
health care standards are adopted by the group, which can then mobilize in aid of 
needy members, further reinforcing the importance of medical care. Institutions do 
not operate in a psychological vacuum, as Bourdieu (1986), Brett (2009) and others 
have pointed out, but rather rely on attitudes and dispositions compatible with their 
core ideas. In Saturia, a dense web of social and institutional relationships 
powerfully reinforce health-compatible attitudes. Elsewhere in Bangladesh, GK 
anchors its health programs in local communities, relying on natural authorities and 
village workers, and so exploiting their local knowledge and credibility (Chaudhury 
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2006). Significantly, BRAC – another large NGO with notable success in the health 
sector – uses a similar model (BRAC 2005). 
In Rajnagar, such relationships unfortunately do not exist. The ideas and 
attitudes towards health care that dominate locally lead, instead, to poor health. 
Faith in traditional and spiritual healers is much more apparent than in Saturia, and 
contraceptive use lower. Villagers report pregnant mothers’ suspicion of antenatal 
care, because, “when mothers take those tablets, the baby becomes too healthy. As a 
result, child delivery is not possible without surgery. So we do not like to give 
mothers those free tablets provided by the government.”  In the home as well, 
nutritional supplements are spurned as families choose to rely instead on 
traditional diets. Villagers shun visits to health centres and medical staff, and so 
pregnant women requiring interventions tend to arrive at the UHC in a near-critical 
state. In some villages, pregnant women may not venture out of the house even if 
gravely ill. And in most cases, a close male relative must accompany mothers. There 
is some evidence suggesting attitudes are beginning to change. But change in 
Rajnagar is painfully slow. 
How do we explain these systematic differences in attitudes, and the 
personal and institutional relationships in which they are enmeshed, that 
characterize our two districts? This paper argues that they are tied to two 
exogenous factors: history and geography. Consider first geography: Saturia lies 
about 50 km west of Dhaka, and is well connected to it by high-quality transport, 
telecommunication and media links, as well as a dense network of personal and 
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professional contacts. The last is key. Saturians can easily commute to work in 
Dhaka, while officials, academics, and NGO professionals from Dhaka can easily 
make day trips to Saturia, often in search of a more “typical” Bangladeshi context 
(i.e. not Dhaka) for fact-finding missions, pilot projects, studies, etc. Hence the 
presence in Saturia of Dhakan ideas, attitudes, and dispositions is readily apparent. 
Rajnagar is some 300 km northeast of Dhaka, and none of this holds true there. 
Access to Dhaka is typically by air plus road travel via Sylhet, or a long trip overland. 
Regular contacts with the capital are accordingly fewer and less intense. Rajnagar 
sits where the broad Bangladeshi plain meets the north-eastern foothills, producing 
a geography that is quite different from the rest of the country. Residents report 
feeling “special” within Bangladesh, and “isolated” from the capital. Such feelings 
inform their behaviour and their identity. 
Second, Rajnagar’s history makes it more religiously conservative and 
observant than Saturia. In 1303, Hazrat Shah Jalal,  a messianic Muslim saint from 
Mecca, arrived in the region and helped defeat the local ruler. With the aid of 300+ 
companions, he spread Islam throughout the region before dying in nearby Sylhet 
around 1350. Sylhet thereby became a centre of Islam in Bengal. Shah Jalal’s shrine 
in the main mosque complex is highly revered, and a holy destination for pilgrims 
from across South Asia. The example of conservative, militant Islam championed by 
a local saint, and the presence of his shrine as a place of pilgrimage and veneration, 
reinforce a conservative religious orthodoxy in Rajnagar in a way that has no 
parallel in Saturia. This orthodoxy underpins a set of ideas and behaviours that 
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translate into specific health care practices and outcomes (Ahamed and Nazneen 
1990). Modern medicine is suspect in Rajnagar, its women are not allowed to 
venture out of doors unaccompanied, and they have much less power to make 
important decisions about their lives than in Saturia. Such ideas and behaviours are 
crucial drivers of the inferior social development outcomes identified in Rajnagar. 
The third important factor is a combination of history and geography: 
Rajnagar has a much lower intensity of NGO interventions than Saturia, a difference 
sustained over several decades. NGOs have played a significant role in raising 
awareness amongst the rural poor and women in Bangladesh since the 1970s, 
changing attitudes towards health care and education, and promoting economic 
empowerment and participation. As a result, women in Saturia are informed about, 
seek, and even participate in the provision of maternal and child health care, birth 
control, and education, to name three key services. Economic empowerment has 
benefited a large share of Saturia’s men as well, and income earning activities – such 
as weaving, pottery-making, and the transformation of foods for market – are 
commonplace in many households. In Rajnagar, none of this is true. Proximity to 
Dhaka undoubtedly facilitates a greater NGO presence in Saturia. But it is the 
intensity of NGO engagement8 – and its persistence over decades – that has 
permitted their interventions to transcend infrastructure and skill-building, to reach 
the deeper beliefs and behaviours of the population. 
                                                        
8
 Faguet and Wietzke (2006) discuss the positive externalities that external interventions can generate in 
local governance systems. 
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Conclusions 
The study of decentralization has for too long assumed that local government 
reforms are a sort of “switch” that is thrown from on high, producing symmetric 
effects throughout a country. But if governments are autonomous, and local officials 
freely elected and beholden to local constituencies, then this idea is absurd. This 
paper argues that decentralization leads, instead, to a heterogeneous response. This 
is because what decentralization does is to set loose a large number of local political 
economy dynamics that are as diverse as the underlying characteristics of all a 
country’s localities. Hence the way to understand decentralization is from the 
ground up, not as a disturbance in government from above, but rather as the onset 
of governance from below. 
Adopting this view, what do we find? Saturia and Rajnagar have similar 
health service administrations, similar infrastructure and equipment, similarly 
qualified staff employed by a common central ministry, and similar local 
government administrations, but very different social outcomes. Why? Because 
their assets and personnel were deployed in very different ways, resulting in 
different levels of service outputs. How did this come about? The answer lies in deep 
changes in Saturians’ dispositions and understandings towards the value of health 
care and other primary services. These are a product of rising education levels 
described above, plus public authorities’ implementation of a primary health care 
model at district and upazila levels. These elements came together to make 
Saturians seek out modern health care, and hold their authorities accountable for its 
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effective provision. Considerable evidence not documented here implies that similar 
dynamics have occurred in education and water, and with respect to local 
government more generally. 
But both education improvements and a new model of primary health care 
are national phenomena in Bangladesh. Why did Saturia take advantage of them to 
improve social outcomes while Rajnagar did not? Because such advances were like 
seeds planted in an institutional soil that nourished them in Saturia, allowing them 
to take root. This “soil” consists of a dense web of relationships between the 
upazila’s natural and legal authorities, service providers, and its citizens, which 
enmeshed such advances – and the reformers driving them forward – in local 
systems of legitimacy and authority. As a result, both reforms and reformers were 
strengthened, and society made more susceptible to change. Saturia’s institutional 
soil was made fertile by a history of sustained NGO involvement, its proximity to the 
capital, and a relatively open, tolerant religious tradition. Similar institutional 
underpinnings, by contrast, were missing in Rajnagar. Citizens felt less connected to 
their authorities and less empowered. Geography and history made barren the soil 
on which the seeds of change fell, and social development stalled. 
In terms of the model, the key difference concerns civil society’s complement 
of organizations and internal dynamics. Indeed, one of the most interesting 
advantages of applying the model to Bangladesh is how the evidence allows us to 
peer into the black box of civil society’s organizational dynamic and focus on the 
web of relationships, and the attitudes and behaviours it supports. In Saturia, civil 
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society was more densely populated by organizations, including but not limited to 
NGOs, and by social connections both amongst Saturians, and between Saturia and 
Dhaka. These organizations use this denser web of connections to alter traditional 
behaviours and impart new information in ways that raised human capital there. 
The immediate effect was more responsive, accountable local government. The 
longer term, and more interesting, effects were not only improved levels of social 
development, but also deep changes in Saturia’s social norms and culture. In 
Rajnagar, by contrast, civil society was dominated by the mosque and by religiously 
inspired beliefs regarding health and the role of women. Penetration by NGOs and 
other outsiders was far lower, and nonreligious civic organizations fewer and less 
influential. This organizational structure of society supported a local government 
that was less accountable and less responsive to citizens’ needs. As a result, 
traditional ideas and behaviours reproduced themselves far more easily in Rajnagar, 
and social development lagged. 
This paper has interesting implications for both the study of local democracy, 
and our understanding of the recent Bangladeshi experience. Regarding local 
democracy, the model presented above was originally developed to explain 
diverging municipal performance in Bolivia. But it can explain differences in local 
government outcomes – measured in different ways – in Bangladesh as well, and so 
travels well across very different economic, political, social, and geographic 
contexts. It further allows us to understand why a common policy reform, producing 
a common local government framework, can nonetheless have radically different 
34 
 
outcomes in different municipalities. Outcomes will differ as a function of the 
underlying social and economic characteristics of each locale, and the political 
dynamics they generate.  
The model also helps to demystify what has become known as the 
“Bangladesh paradox”. This flows from the empirical observation that a very poor 
country with low levels of public sector effectiveness and probity has nonetheless 
made rapid strides in social development since the early 1990s. The answer it 
suggests is that central government ineffectiveness can be overcome by successful 
governance from below. In a country with a weak central state, a strong, 
organizationally dense civil society can partner with active, technically capable 
NGOs to deploy private and public resources in ways that improve local government 
services, and hence social development outcomes. In effect, civic organizations and 
NGOs can empower local authorities to effect powerful change, not just in public 
services, but in the underlying beliefs and behaviours that comprise culture. At the 
limit, the Bangladeshi experience suggests, these effects allowed Bangladesh to 
leapfrog much richer India in terms of social development. 
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